Sovereign-bank feedback loops have been at the heart of the euro area crisis and many previous debt crises. We regress a market measure of interdependency -the correlation between sovereign and bank credit default swaps (CDS) -against various fundamental indicators of interlinkages and risk for 65 banks from 23 countries from Q1 2006 to Q4 2015. We find evidence that direct sovereign debt holdings of banks, implicit contingent liabilities of the government to banks and market volatility are significantly linked to higher correlations. While such CDS correlations are generally higher for banks in countries bank-based financial systems, we do not find these channels to be stronger in these countries than market-based systems. Finally, we find that bank CDS levels perform better in explaining sovereign CDS levels in periods of high volatility. Overall, these results support the notion of non-linear effects and spillovers in CDS markets.
Introduction
The outbreak of the European sovereign debt crisis in 2010 underscored the danger of interdependencies between sovereigns and the banking sector. In Ireland, stress in the banking sector led the government to provide large-scale support in the form of capital injections and guarantees -a "pyrrhic victory" which ultimately compelled the government to request external EU/IMF support (Acharya, Drechsler and Schnabl, 2014) . The fiscal stress and ultimate restructuring of the Greek government, meanwhile, led to the insolvency and restructuring of the Greek and Cypriot banking sectors (Zettelmayer, Trebesch and Gulati, 2013) .
Since then, the so-called "doom loop" (Gros, 2013) , "diabolic loop" (Cooper and Nikolov, 2015) , "deadly embrace" (Farhi and Tirole, 2015) or "hazardous tango" (Merler and Pisani-Ferry, 2012; DNB, 2015) between banks and sovereigns has become the topic of intensive policy and academic discussions. 1 The research of Bolton and Jeanne (2011), Blundell-Wignall and Slovik (2011) and Alter and Schüler (2012) underscores the relevance of these interdependencies in the recent global financial crisis. Yet such links have also played a role in a number of earlier advanced economy and emerging market crises, from the sovereign defaults and banking crises in Denmark in 1813 to Russia in 1998 and Argentina in 2002 (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; .
Despite these contributions, Gray and Jobst (2013) point out that the ultimate impact of such interdependencies on the economy is not entirely understood. Specifically, the impact may be different during normal times than during periods of stress. There may also be important differences between countries based on their market structures. As long as these issues remain unclear, credit risk and pro-cyclical tail risks may remain mispriced and there may be volatile swings in perceptions of the debt sustainability of sovereigns and the banking sector (De Grauwe and Ji, 2013) . Only once the relationship between sovereign and banking risk is better understood can effective policies and regulatory measures be implemented to reduce the probability and impact of financial crises. Consequently, in-depth analysis of sovereign-bank interdependencies is essential from a supervisory, financial stability and monetary policy perspective. This paper investigates which factors drive interdependencies between the credit risk of sovereigns and domestic banks across countries. To tackle this question, we draw on existing theory and empirical work on sovereign risk, banking crises and credit market frictions to distinguish between four potential channels of risk transfer: (i) direct bank-to-sovereign risk transfer; (ii) direct sovereign-to-bank risk transfer; (iii) indirect links through the real economy; and (iv) credit market frictions. The first three channels can be considered fundamental factors of banking and sovereign risk, while the fourth can be considered the result of market inefficiencies.
Our empirical analysis focuses on the level of sovereign-bank interdependencies and the drivers of these links over a broad sample of countries and over the past decade. To assess interdependency, a market measure is applied: the Spearman rank correlation between credit risk returns as given by daily changes in credit default swap (CDS) spreads of individual banks and their home sovereign.
This correlation measures whether the risk premiums of banks and sovereigns hit extreme levels simultaneously. As an identification strategy, we analyze time series changes and cross-sectional differences in this correlation measure against the independent variables intended to proxy the four channels sketched above. We complement this with estimations of the level of CDS spreads of banks and sovereigns. These regressions are estimated for 65 banks in 23 countries with quarterly data over the period Q1 2006-Q4 2015. Our multivariate panel regressions make it possible to determine which factors play the most important role in sovereign-bank interdependencies, based on their statistical and economic significance. The innovation of our analysis is to assess these links not only for a specific stress period, but for a broad range of countries and banks over the period before and after the global financial crisis.
The results of these exercises show that both the exposures by a bank to sovereign debt and the contingent liabilities of the sovereign toward banks are positively and significantly linked to higher correlations between bank and sovereign CDS. While such CDS correlations are generally higher for banks in bank-based financial systems, we do not find these channels to be stronger in these countries than market-based systems. Among control variables, we find that sovereign-bank interdependency is higher in periods of low output growth and greater financial market volatility.
Based on a second set of regressions, we find that sovereign CDS levels are explained by (lagged) bank CDS levels to a greater extent in periods of high volatility. Bank CDS levels show a strong link with lagged sovereign CDS levels across all periods, with no significant additional effect when volatility is high. From these results, we infer that sovereign and bank risks may spill over to one another through direct financial links, both in bank-based systems and market-based financial systems, and that bank-to-sovereign risk transfer is especially important during high volatility in financial markets. This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the emerging theory of sovereign-bank interlinkages based on the relevant literature, and derives testable hypotheses. Section 3 introduces the data, our estimation methodology and some broad trends in the data. Section 4 provides the empirical results in terms of interdependency analysis, regression results and the robustness checks.
Finally, section 5 concludes.
Literature and hypotheses on sovereign-bank interlinkages
In order to structure the growing literature on sovereign-bank interdependencies, this section divides the theoretical models based on the channels that they emphasize. Where relevant, examples from the empirical literature are also given. It concludes by deriving testable hypotheses. Figure 1 gives a schematic overview on the different channels through which sovereigns and banks are interlinked, and shows how these different channels may result in feedback-loops between sovereigns and banks. In general, we can distinguish between: (i) direct bank-to-sovereign risk transfer, such as explicit and implicit government guarantees; (ii) direct sovereign-to-bank risk transfer, such as direct holdings of sovereign debt, correlations in the cost and availability of funding, and the credibility of government support to banks; (iii) indirect links, for example through credit risk in the real economy; and (iv) credit market frictions, which can lead prices of credit risk for both banks and sovereigns to persistently diverge from fundamental values.
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Figure 1 -Transmission channels of sovereign and bank risks
Note: solid arrows refer to direct transmission channels, while dashed arrows are indirect links. Red denotes fundamental factors, while the blue channel is the result of credit market frictions.
The size and relative importance of these channels may differ significantly across countries and over time. For example, we expect differences between countries where credit to the private sector is dominated by bank lending ("bank-based financial systems"), and where non-bank players and capital markets play a larger role ("market-based financial systems;" see Goldsmith, 1969; Levine, 2002; Gambacorta et al., 2014) . In bank-based systems, the government may be more likely to bail out banks, given their importance in financing of the real economy, and may also depend to a greater extent on banks as investors in domestic sovereign debt markets. Moreover, there may be important differences between normal times and more volatile periods, such as financial crises. In normal times, the interdependencies are not problematic: the government can act as a safety net for individual banks, and government debt plays an important role as a safe asset. In periods of high volatility, the interdependencies may become more problematic, as the different channels may result in a vicious circle, feedback loops or non-linear "cliff effects." These ultimately lead to higher financing costs and a greater risk of systemic crises. Particularly problematic are so-called "twin crises" with defaults by the sovereign and the banking sector, which may be larger and more costly than independent crisis events (see Panizza and Borenzstein, 2009; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011; and Balteanu and Erce, 2014) . Finally, when there is strong financial integration, for example in the euro area, there may be important cross-border effects of sovereign debt holdings by foreign banks (Bolton and Jeanne, 2011). 3 Due to data limitations, we will only focus on domestic effects and cross-border contagion will be outside the scope of our analysis.
Direct bank-to-sovereign links
The experience of financial crises over the past decades and the large-scale support provided to financial institutions has given impetus to work on the effects of state support on the affected banks and sovereigns. In these cases, both explicit support to banks (direct capital and liquidity support, deposit insurance) and implicit guarantees (expectations of bail-out) can improve bank solvency, but may erode the solvency of the government. A key study is Gray, Merton and Bodie Similarly to Gray, Merton and Bodie, they find that large support packages provided by sovereigns to the banking sector increase the degree of spillovers from banks to sovereigns.
Meanwhile, Bénassy-Quéré and Roussellet (2014) develop a micro-based measure of implicit contingent liabilities of the sovereign to the banking sector. This is calculated as the difference between the risk-weighted assets (RWA) and the core Tier I capital held by banks, i.e. the amount of risky assets not covered by a bank's own funds. A proxy of this measure, when consistent data on core Tier I capital is not available, is the RWA minus total equity. This can in turn be scaled relative to GDP, which approximates the government's carrying capacity; this measure will be used in our empirical estimations. A large literature including Panetta et al. (2009) and King (2009) examines the impact of state support on banks, and generally finds that interventions lower credit spreads for supported institutions. Yet they do not provide an analysis of the effects of support on the sovereign or on the degree of sovereign-bank interdependencies.
Direct sovereign-to-bank links
The most straightforward channel through which banks can be affected by sovereign risk is through direct holdings of sovereign debt. When government bonds make up a significant portion of banks' assets, changes in the price of sovereign securities -or sovereign default -directly affect bank balance sheets. Losses may cause a decrease in bank's profits, consequently decreasing equity and leading to investor concerns about the solvency of the bank. Moreover, the use of government bonds for liquidity purposes, e.g. as high-quality collateral in private transactions and in central bank liquidity operations, will be impaired by changes in sovereign risk measures.
Gennaioli, Martin and Rossi (2014) model such holdings and the risk of government default.
They show that large-scale bank holdings of sovereign debt may be a key reason why advanced economy sovereigns do not default more often -but also why defaults are extremely costly when they do occur. Their theoretical predictions are that sovereign defaults should cause a contraction in private credit, and that this effect should be larger in countries where financial institutions are more developed and banks hold more government bonds. This is confirmed empirically with a panel of emerging and developing countries over 1980 -2005 . Similarly, D'Erasmo and Mendoza (2016 show theoretically that governments may be able to sustain higher levels of domestic public debt when they have a bias in favor of domestic bondholders.
Among applied empirical work, Blundell-Wignall and Slovik (2011) show that the scale of (domestic) sovereign exposures by Greek and Cypriot banks, as well as some Northern European banks (e.g. Hypo Real Estate) in early 2010 was so large relative to Tier I capital that these banks would not be able to absorb various potential haircuts to the value of such debt. Asonuma, Bakhache and Hesse (2015) show from a large panel of advanced and emerging market economies that greater home bias in the sovereign debt holdings of domestic banks can reduce the cost of borrowing for the sovereign, but can also allow governments to sustain higher deficits and to delay fiscal consolidation until public debt reaches dangerously high levels. Balteanu and Erce (2012) show that, as compared to isolated banking crises, "twin" bank and sovereign debt crises tend to feature a high level and strong growth of exposures by the banking sector to the sovereign.
Banks may increase government bond holdings during a crisis for a variety of reasons. Acharya and Steffen (2015) argue that purchases by euro area banks of peripheral bonds during [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] can be understood as "carry trade" behavior, or an attempt by "large, under-capitalized banks to exploit government guarantees, arbitrage regulatory risk weights, and access central-bank funding." Ongena, Popov and van Horen (2016) show that banks in stressed euro area countries tended to purchase more bonds than foreign banks in months of strong issuance, particularly when they had received state support -a finding linked by the authors to moral suasion. Alternatively, Castro and Mencía (2014) relate such increases to macroeconomic factors, such as industrial production and unemployment, which may indicate a lack of private credit demand.
In addition to the risks to banks after a sovereign default, banks' sovereign exposures may crowd out private credit, through various channels. Bottero, Lenzu and Mezzanotti (2015) find that the Greek bailout in 2010, which led to a reassessment of the riskiness of sovereign exposures of banks, also led to a tightening in the credit supply of banks to firms. They estimate that the drop in bank lending by Italian banks to firms reached 2 percent over the subsequent year. Similarly, Popov and van Horen (2012) find significant effects of sovereign debt degradation on the real economy via the bank lending channel and the quality of the banking sector.
Indirect links
Sovereigns and banks can also be interdependent through their joint reliance on the real economy. Theoretically, Di Iasio and Pierobon (2013) show how the creditworthiness of the sovereign can affect bail-out expectations and liquidity risk of private intermediaries, including shadow banks. When creditworthiness deteriorates, this could force deleveraging pressures through financial markets, which can have significant effects on the real economy. Empirically, Angelini, Granda and Panetta (2014) find that the correlations between sovereign and bank CDS are not higher than correlations between sovereigns and non-financial companies in the euro area. They interpret this as evidence that "country risk seems to be a key factor underlying the sovereign-bank relationship." This issue will be returned to in an extension to our baseline model in section 4.3, where we examine differences between the sovereign-bank and "sovereign-corporate" nexus.
Credit market frictions
Finally, both sovereign and bank risk may be affected by frictions in credit markets, e.g. due to information asymmetries or to coordination failures, particularly during periods of stress. In this vein, Broner, Erce, Martin and Ventura (2014) develop a theoretical model in which domestic and foreign investors can trade sovereign debt in the secondary market, but where creditor discrimination leads to a higher expected return for domestic investors when default risk rises. At the same time, due to financial frictions, such purchases crowd out private borrowing, thus displacing productive investment and reducing growth and welfare.
There is a large empirical literature seeking to explain movements in credit market spreads (see for example, Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin, 2001 and Haugh, Ollivaud and Turner, 2009 ).
For the euro area crisis, De Grauwe and Ji (2013) argue that the lack of explanatory power of debtto-GDP ratios before the crisis, and the dramatic (non-linear) increase in spreads since 2008, is evidence of such mispricing in the euro area CDS market. Yet as de Haan, van den End and Hessel (2013) show, estimations of credit spreads may be heavily influenced by modelling choices such as sample selection, inclusion of financial variables and whether coefficients are allowed to change across countries and over time. For this reason, such estimations must be approached with the proper care, and while some developments may appear to result from market frictions, it is difficult to isolate these definitively in practice.
Testable hypotheses
With these channels now described, we develop two testable hypotheses. Our first hypothesis exploits variation in our market measure of interdependency, namely Spearman correlations. One reason why the CDS premiums of banks and sovereigns would move together is because the assets and liabilities of domestic banks and the sovereign are directly linked, either through exposures of the banks to their sovereign, e.g. holdings of sovereign debt, or through (potential) commitments of the sovereign to domestic banks, e.g. explicit or implicit guarantees (sections 2.1 and 2.2 above).
The higher these direct exposures, the more the riskiness of the sovereign and the banks will be related. An increase in the (perceived) riskiness of the one would lead to a higher (perceived) riskiness of the other. Yet the impact of direct mutual exposures on the sovereign-bank interdependency may not be the same for all countries, and -in addition to indicators of the real economy (section 2.3) -may also depend on market structure. For example, in countries where the banking sector provides a larger share of overall credit and is thus more systemically important, the government is more likely to guarantee banking sector liabilities in stress periods. Similarly, when banks are more dominant in private credit provision, they may also be a more important segment of the investor base for government debt. Hence, we would expect to see higher sovereign-bank interdependencies in these countries than in countries where the banking sector is less dominant:
H1: Higher exposures of banks to sovereigns and higher implicit contingent liabilities are tied to a higher market perception of sovereign-bank interdependencies (i.e. higher Spearman correlations), and these effects are larger in countries with bank-based financial systems.
Of course, it is possible that the direct exposure channels only affect short-term market correlations but not actual levels of risk premiums. Our second hypothesis seeks to exclude this possibility. Specifically, we investigate how CDS spreads of sovereigns spill over to banks and vice versa. We expect that the CDS premiums of banks will be higher when the sovereign is under strain, and that sovereign CDS rise when banks are in distress. Moreover, we would expect these spillovers to be especially large in periods of financial volatility. This yields our second hypothesis:
H2: Sovereign credit spreads are a stronger determinant of bank credit spreads, and bank spreads are a stronger determinant of sovereign spreads, in periods of high market volatility.
This hypothesis can best be tested by estimating the level of sovereign and bank credit spreads directly. If the explanatory power of lagged sovereign (bank) credit spreads on bank (sovereign) spreads rises when volatility is high, this is further evidence of non-linear effects, such as a feedback loop. Moreover, because higher credit spreads for sovereigns lead to a greater fiscal burden, and higher spreads for banks tend to be passed on to private borrowers, examining the level of spreads allows us to make a more direct link to potential welfare effects.
Data, methodology and trends
To investigate sovereign-bank interdependencies across countries and time, we introduce our data sources and our market measure of bank-sovereign links, namely the Spearman correlation between CDS premiums of a banking group and its home sovereign. Next, we empirically test which factors are the most important in explaining such links, by regressing our measure on specific bank, sovereign and country characteristics.
Data sources
The analysis on sovereign-bank interdependencies is performed on a panel data set of 65 banks in 23 countries at quarterly frequency over the course of 10 years (Q1 2006-Q4 2015) . The country choice and the period for the analysis were restricted largely by data availability of the CDS series. 
Measure of sovereign-bank interdependencies
Our measure for the degree of interdependencies between sovereigns and the domestic banking sectors is derived from the co-movement of the relevant CDS series. In particular, the CDS series of each bank is compared with its domestic sovereign's CDS series. In order to capture comovement (i.e. the timing of large increases and decreases in credit risk, rather than the scale of such changes), the Spearman's rank correlation was employed. Since CDS spreads tend to be nonstationary, the degree of co-movement between returns instead of levels is measured. For each series, daily returns were calculated by taking differences between two end-of-the-day spreads. 6 The returns in each series are assigned ranks according to their values. Once the ranking process is completed, the linear correlations between the rankings of sovereign and bank CDS are computed according to the standard Pearson's formula:
is the covariance of the bank and sovereign CDS spreads and and are the standard deviation of each series. The resulting daily values are averaged out to produce quarterly data. 7 Although we also use other correlation measures to test the robustness of our results, an advantage of the Spearman rank correlation is that it does not assume a linear relationship between the two series.
Explanatory variables
In order to determine the factors underlying the level of sovereign-bank interdependencies several measures representing the sovereign to bank and bank to sovereign exposures were developed. The preferred measures are the following two measures:
 Sovereign exposures of banks -the claims on governments by a bank relative to its total assets. This series is on a consolidated basis. A key limitation is that it captures holdings of all government debt, rather than just the debt of the domestic sovereign. While domestic sovereign exposures are available for the entire banking sector in most EU countries (and are used in the robustness checks), they are not consistently available for individual banks, or for other regions. However, in most non-EU countries, domestic debt is a majority of banks' sovereign debt portfolios, making this a reasonable proxy. 8 Larger holdings of sovereign debt should be associated with higher sovereign-bank interdependency.
 Implicit contingent liabilities of the sovereign -in line with Bénassy-Quéré and Roussellet (2014), the amount of implicit liabilities is proxied by the RWA minus total equity of each bank, divided by the domestic country's GDP. 9 Even though not contracted by law, there is an expectation of sovereign support to domestic banks in times of distress. Consequently, a larger and riskier banking sector with a lower equity cushion increases the amount of potential support. An increase in this measure should lead to increasing levels of sovereignbank interdependencies. 10
In addition to sovereign-bank exposures, bank and sovereign risk determinants are incorporated into the model. This relates to the notion that the state of the banking sector is an important determinant of sovereign CDS and vice versa (Dieckmann and Plank, 2011) . 
where , , denotes our correlation measure for bank i and quarter t, Xi,t-1 is a proxy of direct sovereign-to-bank risk transfer channels, lagged by one quarter; Yi,t-1 is a proxy of direct bank-tosovereign risk transfer; Zi,t-1 is a vector with bank and sovereign ratings and output growth; and σ,t is overall financial market volatility, proxied by the VIX, which is included contemporaneously (i.e. in the same quarter). 12 The variables α, γ, and ε are, respectively, the constant, the bank fixed effects term and an error term. The variables β1, β2, β3, and β4 denote our estimated coefficients.
These equations are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). A Hausman test confirms the choice of fixed effects, as random effects would be inconsistent. Due to some autocorrelation in the quarterly data, we also show the baseline regressions with the lagged dependent variable, , ,
. Throughout the regressions, we use clustered standard errors.
To better test the differences between bank-based and market-based systems, we use simple interaction terms, such that the estimation becomes:
11 Countries with relatively bank-based systems are those where the average share of bank credit in total credit is above the sample median, while market-based systems have bank credit shares below the median. Note that some traditionally bank-based countries, such as Germany and Japan, have seen a growing role of non-bank credit in the past decade, such that they are now relatively market-based. Emerging market economies generally have a large bank share of credit. Alternative data sources, such as the OECD, yield a similar relative ranking of countries, but do not have data on the bank share of credit for all countries over the full sample period. 12 The independent variables are lagged by one quarter as a simple means of addressing reverse causality. The VIX is shorter-term and less likely to be influenced by individual countries in the sample. 
where , −1 is the financial structure of the country (i.e. the share of bank credit in overall credit), and , −1 * , −1 and , −1 * , −1 are, respectively, the products of this measure and direct sovereign-to-bank and bank-to-sovereign risk transfer channels.
In line with our second hypothesis, we would like to exclude the possibility that correlations only concern short-term co-movement. Hence, in a second step, we estimate the levels of banks CDS and sovereign CDS spreads directly. These regressions take the form of: 
where , denotes the quarterly average of 5-year CDS spreads for bank i in quarter t, , is the quarterly average 5-year CDS spreads of sovereign j in quarter t, and the other variables are the same as in equation (1). The key difference in equation (4) is that all variables are now at the country level, such that the sovereign-to-bank and bank-to-sovereign risk transfer indicators are a total for the entire banking sector (from IMF IFS). Meanwhile, ̅ , −1 denotes an average for all of the banks from country j in the sample, and are now country fixed effects. Table 1 the quarterly average levels of bank and sovereign CDS (80%) is much higher than the average of within-quarter Spearman correlations of daily changes, which are used in the regressions. The high correlation between sovereign and bank ratings (70%) calls for some caution in interpreting the effects of regressions that include both variables. The high (negative) correlation between sovereign ratings and sovereign CDS, and between bank ratings and bank CDS is in line with expectations, as more creditworthy banks and sovereigns have lower financing costs. In the second step, ratings will thus form an important control variable on the right-hand side of regressions on CDS spread levels. Figure 2 shows the correlation of sovereign and bank CDS premiums over time, split by countries with relatively bank-based versus relatively market-based financial systems. The strong increase in the correlation measures between 2007 and 2009 is striking. This is unlikely to be the result of changes in fundamental factors alone, but could rather be interpreted as evidence of a repricing of risk through feedback loops. Moreover, we find that the sovereign-bank interdependency is generally higher for banks in countries with a bank-based financial system than in countries with a market-based financial system. Also, the decline in the correlation in the postcrisis period has been more pronounced in in countries with a market-based financial system. 
Descriptive statistics
6. Trends in the data
Empirical results and robustness checks
Regression results
To test our first hypothesis we regress the correlation between bank and sovereign CDS premiums on banks' holdings of sovereign debt and the contingent liabilities of the sovereign to the bank. While our hypothesis focuses on the direct risk transfer channels (1 and 2 in figure 1), we also control for indirect links in the regressions. Common exposures to economic shocks can be captured with GDP growth, while financial shocks should be captured with the VIX. We also include bank fixed effects to take into account unobserved bank-specific characteristics.
The results are shown in table 3. For the first regression (column 1) with only the direct risk transfer channels and the VIX, we find that larger sovereign exposures are associated with a significantly higher correlation between the CDS premiums of banks and their sovereign. In economic terms, an increase in sovereign exposures by 4% of total assets (one standard deviation in Italy during the sample) is associated with a sovereign-bank CDS correlation that is 5.9
percentage points higher. Higher contingent liabilities, as measured by the Bénassy-Quéré and Roussellet (2014) measure, are also associated with a tighter sovereign-bank link. The economic significance is generally smaller: an increase in this measure by 7.5% of GDP (one standard deviation in Brazil or Turkey) is associated with an increase by 1.3 pp in the sovereign-bank CDS correlation. To test whether this effect depends on the riskiness of the sovereign holdings of banks, we include the sovereign rating and its interaction with sovereign exposures as explanatory variables (column 2). We find that these variables are not significantly related to the sovereignbank CDS correlation. This suggests that higher sovereign exposures are associated with stronger bank-sovereign interdependencies, irrespective of the riskiness of these exposures. Together, these results suggest that across all the banks and countries under analysis, both bank-to-sovereign links and sovereign-to-bank links are tied to higher interdependency. Moreover, these interdependencies are higher when financial market stress, as measured by the VIX, is high. impact on the sovereign-bank link. However, and as expected, the coefficient of GDP growth is strongly negative and significant. Financial market stress remains associated with significantly higher correlations between the CDS premiums. As a simple means of testing for potential autocorrelation, the lagged dependent variable can be included (column 4). In this specification, the direct sovereign-to-bank and bank-to-sovereign risk transfer channels and VIX remain significant.
If correlations between CDS premiums are tied primarily to implicit guarantees of the sovereign, we expect this effect to be stronger in countries where the government is more likely to finance a bail-out of the banking system, and where banks are larger relative players in the financial system and sovereign debt markets. This could be the case in bank-based financial systems, i.e.
those countries where the banking system is more important for aggregate private credit (Gambacorta et al., 2014) . Thus, we test the second part of our first hypothesis by interacting our measure of implicit guarantees with the share of bank credit in total credit to the economy. Column (5) of table 3 shows the results of this regression. While the coefficient of the interaction term between exposures and the bank share in credit is positive, it is not statistically significant (t-value of 1.32). The coefficient of implicit liabilities is now much larger, but the negative interaction term implies that this effect is decreasing in the share of bank credit. This means that, ceteris paribus, higher implicit contingent liabilities are tied to greater interdependencies primarily in market-based financial systems, and not in highly bank-based systems. 13 Overall, we can only confirm the first half of our first hypothesis. Higher exposures of banks to sovereigns and a larger banking sector are indeed tied to a higher market perception of sovereign-bank interdependencies, but we cannot confirm that this effect is larger in bank-based financial systems.
The empirical testing of our second hypothesis goes more deeply into the feedback mechanism between banks and sovereigns, as we analyze how direct risk transfer channels, sovereign fundamentals and sovereign credit spreads influence bank credit spreads, and how these links, bank fundamentals and bank credit spreads influence sovereign spreads. We analyze how these effects are manifested in both stressed and tranquil market conditions by interacting the CDS premiums of the other sector with financial market volatility (the VIX).
We start with bank CDS (table 4) . First, we find that without controlling for sovereign fundamentals, there is a statistically significant link between the level of bank CDS spreads and the scale of bank exposures to sovereigns (column 1). The measure of implicit contingent liabilities, which could measure the uplift from expectations of sovereign support, is not significant. Second, moving on to the risk measures, we confirm that CDS premiums of banks are not only affected by their own risk characteristics, but also by the riskiness of the home sovereign. We find that the link between a bank's CDS spread and its sovereign exposures seems to be particularly strong when the domestic sovereign has a higher credit rating (column 2). This may imply that the value of (implicit) sovereign support is higher in countries with a relatively creditworthy sovereign. The sovereign rating, itself, has a significant negative coefficient, with each one notch upgrade being associated with a roughly 29 bp improvement in spreads (column 3). When the lagged sovereign CDS spread is included as an independent variable (column 4), this has a coefficient close to 1. In this specification, sovereign exposures become insignificant, but the implicit liabilities do show up with the expected negative sign, implying sovereign uplift.
Finally, and most importantly for our second hypothesis, we are interested in how the significance of the sovereign CDS and sovereign rating for bank spreads during depends on market volatility. We find that the relation between the level of sovereign CDS and bank CDS is not significantly affected by the VIX (column 5). In other words, while lagged sovereign CDS levels are a (highly) important determinant of bank CDS levels, the sovereign-to-bank risk transfer does not appear to differ between low and high-volatility periods.
Table 4: Estimations of bank CDS with fixed effects
Note: * significance at 90%; ** significance at 95%; *** significance at 99%. Constants are not reported.
(1) (2) (3) (4) For sovereign CDS (table 5) , on the other hand, we do find a positive interaction effect, i.e.
higher spillovers when the VIX is high. These regressions, which are performed at the country level, again begin with only the direct risk transfer channels (columns 1 and 2). Here, the coefficient for the total banking sector's exposures to sovereigns (now from IMF IFS, at quarterly frequency and on a locational basis) is positive but insignificant. When including the sovereign rating and the interaction of this rating and the sovereign exposures of the banking sector, we find a significantly negative coefficient for the sovereign rating, as expected, but no effect of the rating on the significance of sovereign exposures (column 2). The implicit liabilities measure, which is a sum for all of the banks in sample and should be associated with higher sovereign CDS spreads, is not significant. When the bank rating is added (columns 3 and 4), it has a significant negative sign, with a one-notch upgrade of any major bank being associated with a decline in the sovereign CDS spread of 18 bp. Note that the coefficient of the bank rating is higher than that of the sovereign rating, with the sovereign rating even becoming insignificant after adding the lagged average CDS spread of the banks in sample (weighted by total assets) as an explanatory variable. As expected, higher output growth is also linked to lower sovereign CDS spreads in the respective quarter.
Finally, and again important for our second hypothesis, we consider the role of market volatility in the relation between (lagged) banking CDS spreads and the sovereign CDS (column 5). Here, we find that market volatility is associated with a significantly stronger link between the banking CDS and sovereign CDS. This shows that the riskiness of the banking sector matters more for market perceptions of sovereign creditworthiness during stressed market conditions.
Table 5: Estimations of sovereign CDS with fixed effects
Robustness checks
The above results have been subjected to a number of tests in which we alter the model specifications and the way the variables are constructed. These tests generally support the key results of our baseline regressions, though statistical significance (particularly of implicit contingent liabilities) sometimes changes. The results of several tests on the correlations are presented in table 6.
One possible criticism of our baseline regression is that the VIX, as a global variable, may not be equally appropriate for each country in the sample. One alternative measure that has recently become available for major economies is the economic policy uncertainty index of Baker, Bloom and Davis (2015) . This index, based on the frequency of key words regarding economic policy uncertainty in international newspapers, is positively correlated with the VIX, but is more sensitive A second potential criticism is that the effects may be different across jurisdictions, and in particular in the members of a currency union -particularly the euro area -than in countries with their own currency (De Grauwe and Ji, 2013; Van Loon and De Haan, 2015) . When dividing our sample (columns 2 and 3) we can confirm that both bank exposures and contingent liabilities have a stronger association with CDS interdependency for banks inside the euro area. Sovereign exposures are also highly significant for non-euro area banks, while contingent liabilities are not. Where available, we use information on bank exposures to the domestic sovereign rather than the broader class of sovereign exposures (including Sweden, but with the exception of the UK).
Although this is a more precise test of our hypotheses, the information is only available for EU countries. Moreover, we define the bank-sovereign correlations at the country level, i.e. the correlations between the domestic sovereign and an index of the banks in sample from that country, weighted by total assets (columns 4 and 5). Here, we find that bank exposures to the domestic sovereign (from ECB) and the level of implicit liabilities are highly significant. When we interact these variables with the bank share in total credit, we find that both bank exposures to the domestic sovereign and the level of implicit liabilities are more strongly related to the CDS correlation if the share of bank credit is higher. While this exercise has a number of caveats (including fewer observations and aggregation of important bank-specific indicators), these results are fully in line with the first hypothesis. Again, this suggests there may be potential for further investigating the differences between bank-based and market-based economies, and for the specific characteristics of the euro area.
Finally, additional checks have confirmed that the results are robust to using a simple Pearson's correlation as the dependent variable, and to alternative definitions of implicit contingent liabilities, including the size of the banking sector, leverage ratios or the largest banks in percent of GDP. The sign and significance of coefficients are comparable to the baseline regressions. These results are omitted for brevity but are available upon request.
Extensions
In general, we would expect to find positive correlations between the sovereign CDS and that of other domestic counterparties, both financial institutions and non-financial corporates. Both sovereigns and private borrowers are subject to shocks in the domestic economy, and the riskiness of the sovereign is an important determinant of the credit rating of domestic borrowers. However, implicit in our analysis is the idea that the relationship between banks and sovereigns is "special."
Banks are typically large holders of sovereign debt, whereas the government is more inclined to use large amounts of financial support for the banking sector than for other sectors in the economy.
(By way of illustration: governments bail out banks, like ING, but are much less likely to bail out large corporates, like Royal Dutch Shell). So even though the risk premiums of the sovereign and a wide range of domestic borrowers may be correlated, we would expect this to be the result of the (indirect) links through dependence on the real economy and, to a lesser extent, financial markets (channels 3 and 4 in figure 1 ).
Figure 4: The sovereign-bank nexus versus the "sovereign-corporate nexus"
Note: Bars show the average correlation for country groups in sample. The correlation between corporate and sovereign CDS spreads uses the same calculation method as for the sovereign bank-correlation: a Spearman rank correlation calculated with daily data, based on the data within the respective quarter.
When we compare the level of correlation of sovereign and bank CDS premiums to that of sovereign and corporate CDS premiums, we find no large differences on average. But when we divide the sample into countries with a bank based versus a market based financial system, we find that the difference between the two sub-samples is substantially larger for the sovereign-bank correlation (figure 4). Moreover, when rerunning the above regressions at the country level with the correlation between sovereign CDS and average corporate CDS premiums as the dependent variable (not reported), we find a stronger effect for changes in GDP growth and a weaker effect for our direct risk transfer channels than for our baseline regressions with bank CDS premiums.
This illustrates that the existence of direct feedback mechanisms is especially important for sovereigns and banks, and is again an invitation for further analysis.
Conclusions
In this study, we have investigated four types of channels which may impact sovereign-bank interdependencies across countries and time. With our empirical analysis, we can confirm that the two direct channels of risk transfer -through sovereign debt holdings of banks, which expose banks to sovereign risk shocks, and risk-weighted assets minus total equity relative to GDP, which measure implicit contingent liabilities to banks -are linked to higher correlations between sovereign and bank CDS. Thus, the market perception of interdependency between sovereign and banking credit risk does respond to fundamental factors. These relationships are present when controlling for changes in sovereign and bank ratings, macroeconomic factors and market volatility.
Yet somewhat surprisingly, we do not find these effects to be stronger in bank-based than in market- 
Market based countries
Average correlation Banks and Sovereigns Corporates and Sovereigns based financial systems. We can thus confirm the importance of direct risk transfer channels, but not the expectation of a stronger effect in bank-based systems, at least when the analysis is done at the level of individual banks.
From a systemic risk perspective, such correlations are relevant primarily if they lead to higher financing costs for banks or sovereigns, particularly in periods of stress. Our second hypothesis, which relates to the impact of sovereign (bank) credit premiums on the level of bank (sovereign) credit premiums, offers a more complete picture. When volatility is high, markets are more likely to consider the riskiness of banks as relevant for sovereign risk and to charge higher financing costs.
Banks with higher sovereign exposures may also pay higher spreads, but the impact of sovereign premiums does not appear to be higher in periods of high volatility. This appears to underscore the importance of sovereign-to-bank risk transfer.
Overall, our results show that market data across countries and time may hold important clues to how systemic risk is manifested. Especially CDS markets hold great potential for empirical analysis. It is perhaps tempting during bouts of high market volatility to claim that markets are overreacting and that credit spreads in the financial markets do not correspond to fundamentals.
While this may or may not be true and objectively measurable, it has to be recognized that market prices do matter for the liquidity and solvency of both sovereigns and banks, and do have real effects on overall macroeconomic outcomes. From a systemic risk perspective, it is thus important to consider how policy choices -such as the preferential treatment of sovereign debt in prudential regulation, large and undercapitalized banking sectors, or expectations of state support to banksmay influence the probability and severity of financial shocks and "twin crises." Policies such as the zero risk weighting for sovereign exposures in Basel III, the lack of large exposure limits and numerous other exemptions for banks' holdings of sovereign debt seem particularly relevant in this context. Overall, our results at the least provide grounds for caution when considering the retention of such policy measures which strengthen sovereign-bank interdependencies. Table A1 shows the list of countries and banks included in this study. Our sample of 23 countries is determined largely by the availability of CDS data, i.e. the presence of an active CDS market, and reliable macroeconomic and bank balance sheet data. Our sample includes 15 countries categorized by Laeven and Valencia (2013) as having systemic banking crisis over 2007-2010, and 8 countries without. 14 Moreover, we have 13 EU members and 5 emerging economies as classified by the IMF. Banks are selected based on the existence of an active CDS market, with prices that change on at least 5 trading days within a single quarter. In general, these are the most systemically important institutions within their respective jurisdictions. 
Annex: Countries and banks in sample
